Copying machines by Shiga, John
 
Transposition
Musique et Sciences Sociales 
6 | 2016
Lignes d’écoute, écoute en ligne
Copying machines








CRAL - Centre de recherche sur les arts et le langage
 
Electronic reference
John Shiga, « Copying machines », Transposition [Online], 6 | 2016, Online since 20 March 2017,
connection on 30 July 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/transposition/1569  ; DOI : 10.4000/
transposition.1569 
This text was automatically generated on 30 July 2019.
La revue Transposition est mise à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons
Attribution - Partage dans les Mêmes Conditions 4.0 International.
Copying machines
Unconscious musical plagiarism and the mediatisation of listening and
memory
John Shiga
1 Introduced into musical copyright discourse in the early twentieth century, the notion of
cryptomnesia or unconscious plagiarism highlights a key tension in copyright law. On the
one  hand,  copyright  acts  as  a  recognizing  authority  for  claims  to  authorship  and
originality,  thus  providing  economic  incentives  to  authors  whose  work is  “original,”
which in turn encourages cultural innovation. On the other hand, copyright facilitates
ownership and control of cultural works by institutions rather than by authors, since its
minimal  notion  of  “originality”  and  extended  period  of  protection  encourage  the
production  and  exploitation  of  increasingly  similar  works.  This  tension  reaches  a
breaking point in cases where two individuals claim sole authorship of what jurists and
musicological experts deem to be the “same” work. These contested similarities highlight
the dispersion of  perceptual,  signifying,  mnemonic,  and creative  processes  across  an
expansive and heterogeneous network that includes not only composers, musicians, and
producers, but also institutions and machines, thus leading to the present difficulty of
recentering the authorial subject in legal discourses and practices. 
2 Twentieth  century  concerns  about  unconscious  plagiarism  anticipate  contemporary
anxieties about the entanglement of creative and consumer subjectivities with digital
techniques in recent litigation campaigns against mash-up remixing, peer-to-peer file
sharing,  and  other  popular  practices  of  online  music  reproduction;  in  all  of  these
instances,  copyright  becomes  a  key  site  for  juridical  reassertions  of  the  boundary
between machine processes and “properly human” capacities to listen to, experience,
remember,  and create musical  works.  Legal  debates about cryptomnesia may thus be
usefully revisited as a way of investigating what Lauren Rabinovich and Abraham Geil call
“the politics of the history of the relationships between machines and human subjectivity
that have resulted in the present moment”.1 While references to unconscious plagiarism
or cryptomnesia are rare in the case law on musical plagiarism, the court proceedings
and decisions in music plagiarism provide an opportunity to explore legal assumptions
about the appropriate relationship between media, memory, and musical composition. In
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this sense,  copyright acts as a site for disciplining and normalising certain modes of
listening to and remembering sound recordings, which in turn help smooth over tensions
in the field of capitalist music (re)production. 
 
Musical memory and the construction of the author
3 The construction of the author-as-owner in copyright law has been extensively explored
from a wide range of disciplinary perspectives.2 Many scholars have critically examined
the possessiveness, rationality, creativity, individualism, and autonomy of the authorial
subject, but relatively little attention has been given to the construction of the author’s
memory.3 Yet, legal claims to authorship and thus to originality depend on the capacities
to recall past musical experiences and to recognize such experiences as memories rather
than as one’s own creations.  Although there is  no explicit  articulation of memory in
copyright doctrines or statutes, this article probes assumptions about musical memory
underlying copyright law’s  discourse on unconscious plagiarism.  Such cases can thus
provide insight into the ways in which copyright law and the broader economy of musical
rights shape and are in turn shaped by what Susannah Radstone and Katharine Hodgkin
call  a  regime of memory:  a  regime of  memory is  a  set  of  discourses,  institutions,  and
practices which valorize and enforce models or figurations of  memory within a given
cultural space or field.4
4 Many scholars working in memory studies argue that the construction of memory in
modern Western societies is inextricably linked to the development of the bounded subject
who  supposedly  contains  or  possesses  memory.5 Copyright  law  acts  as  a  regime  of
memory  by  producing  truth-claims  about  memory  which  reinforce  a  version  of  the
bounded subject central to the creative industries: the author-as-owner. While courts in
Canada and the United States have used the concept of  cryptomnesia to account for
certain instances of plagiarism, they do not recognize unconscious copying as a full or
partial defence against claims of copyright infringement. The legal system’s cautious use
of the concept of cryptomnesia suggests that associated figurations of musical memory as
at  least  partly  non-conscious  have  the  potential  to  disrupt  copyright’s  ideals  of
authorship,  originality,  and  creativity,  as  well  as  the  rationales  according  to  which
copyright distributes ownership titles and settles authorial disputes.
5 It  would  be  difficult  to  conceptualize  authors  as  the  owners  of  discourse  without
construing memory as a type of cognitive “container technology,” enabling the subject to
store and possess objects apprehended through experience before expressing them in
“works  of  authorship.”  In  this  particular  figuration,  memory  contains  musical
experiences  along  with  other  experiences  of  the  social  world.  However,  as  I  will
demonstrate  in  my  analysis  of  the  case  law  on  musical  plagiarism,  copyright  also
presumes that  memory organizes these experiences and facilitates the monitoring of
their sources during the creative process. In this sense, the normalisation of individual
and  organisational  dispositions  towards  musical  discourse  as  property  in  copyright
depends  on  the  responsibilisation  of  authors  for  monitoring  and  policing  divisions
between their practices of listening, remembering, and making. According to copyright
law,  “normal”  musical  memory  maintains  sharp  boundaries  between  self / other,
experience / expression,  and  recollection / composition,  which  prevent  the
misrecognition of musical experiences as one’s own inventions. 
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6 However, figurations of memory articulated in the courtroom do not always conform to
the juridical ideal of bounded subjectivity. Following Radstone and Hodgkin, the tensions
and contradictions that emerge in the legal system’s figurations of memory can be used
to  reveal  “the  difficulties  inherent  in  attempts  to  conceptualise  the  bounded  self’s
relation  to  the  social”.6 These  tensions  are  particularly  pronounced  in  cases  of
cryptomnesia wherein the court deems the plaintiff’s work to be the causa sine qua non of
the infringing work and yet accepts the defendant’s claim to have no memory of the
plaintiff’s work. The composer’s memory is constructed as disorganized, leaky, blurry,
and  unreliable  in  contrast  to  the  container-like  memory  associated  with “normal”
authorship. As Radstone and Hodgkin argue, since the notion of memory as a container is
so central to bounded subjectivity, figurations of memory that suggest a close connection
or fluid relationship between recollection and composition can problematize that form of
subjectivity. “Memory is associated with coherent, bounded and sovereign subjectivity.
Yet memory emerges, at points, as that which undermines that very conceptualisation of
the subject.”7
7 To  explain  unintentional  or  unremembered  plagiarism,  courts  often  present  the
plagiarist’s memory as indiscriminate in its accumulation of traces and autonomous in
the  manner  in  which it  re-presents  those  traces  to  consciousness;  memory  contains
permanent records of all experiences and operates independently of the subject’s conscious
mind. The figuration of the plagiarist’s memory helps to resolve authorial disputes by
attributing the production of strikingly similar works to the composers’  memory, the
leaky boundaries of which allow recollections of the works of others to seep into the
creative  process.  But  the  introduction  of  unconscious  recollection  and  unwitting
plagiarism can also draw attention to a set of conceptual tensions and displacements.
First,  memory as a container for experiences is displaced by the unsettling notion of
“being possessed” by an overly-active unconscious memory that intervenes in musical
composition (and presumably other thought processes as well). Second, the demand for
originality, which is an evidentiary requirement for a successful copyright infringement
lawsuit, in some cases generates anxiety that all works that resembles one’s own work are
strikingly similar and are therefore illegitimate copies. 
8 The figuration of memory as acting unpredictably and independently of consciousness is
often  associated  with  Freudian  psychoanalysis,  wherein  the  subject  “balances  only
precariously upon its own ‘primitive’ and / or infantile substratum—a substratum that
could rise up and ‘possess’  its  possessor”.8 However,  when the legal  system refers to
cryptomnesia,  it  invokes  a  figuration  of  memory  that  emerged  in  another  line  of
psychoanalytic thought stemming from the work of Carl Jung.9 The concept was imported
into the case law on musical plagiarism in a 1924 decision in Fred Fisher v. Dillingham, a
musical copyright infringement lawsuit filed in a US court.10 In his decision, Judge Hand
wrote  that  he  could  not  find  any  reason  for  Jerome  Kern,  a  well-known  Broadway
composer, to risk his reputation by copying someone else’s work. To explain how Kern
unwittingly plagiarized someone else’s work, Judge Hand construed Kern’s memory as
accumulating  objects  of  memory  without  forgetting,  and  as  acting  independently  of
conscious thought. As Judge Hand explained,
Whether he unconsciously copied the figure, he cannot say, and does not try to.
Everything registers somewhere in our memories, and no one can tell what may
evoke it. On the whole, my belief is that, in composing the accompaniment to the
refrain of “Kalua,” Mr. Kern must have followed, probably unconsciously, what he
had certainly often heard only a short time before. I cannot really see how else to
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account for a similarity, which amounts to identity. So to hold I need not reject his
testimony that he was unaware of such a borrowing.
9 Since the court  found that  Kern was  exposed to  the plaintiff’s  work,  the “identical”
elements in their compositions could not be coincidental, or the results of what jurists
now call “independent  creation.”  Judge  Hand  offered  a  version  of  the  accumulative
subject who possesses, but is also in some sense possessed by, a memory that contains a
register of everything, including those experiences which the subject cannot recall.
10 References to this figuration of memory as a kind of incessant recording system that
sends memories of musical experience to consciousness in the guise of original musical
expressions  have  become  increasingly  common  in  legal  commentary  and  in
contemporary legal decisions. I will discuss the problems that this figuration of memory
poses for the agency of the creative subject in my analysis of the case law on unconscious
musical plagiarism. But first I will address key questions about the relationship between
figurations of memory and the regulation of copying which emerge even in apparently
intentional  or  conscious  instances  of  musical  plagiarism:  how  do  the  institutional
practices  of  copyright  law  and  musicological  expertise  affect  the  manner  in  which
“private”  memory  is  translated  into  “public”  forms  of  testimony,  recollection  and
interpretation? And if memory is potentially disruptive of copyright law, how do jurists
and courts “domesticate” memory or make it less threatening to copyright’s regulatory
framework and to its key conceptual personage—the author-as-owner?
11 While this article focuses on the discourse of cryptomnesia in the Canadian context, the
analysis may be useful for understanding how copyright operates as a technology for
regulating musical  memory in other countries as well.  Although there are important
differences  in  the  copyright  laws  of  different  countries,  as  a  signatory  to  the  Berne
Convention and other international copyright treaties, Canada’s copyright legislation is
based on widely recognized principles such as a minimum term of copyright protection
(life of the author plus fifty years), the authorization of translations as a right of authors,
and the granting of copyright the moment an expression is “fixed” in communicable form
(there is no requirement to register the work to receive copyright protection).11 Although
Canada has been a member of the Berne Convention since 1886, Canadian policy makers,
like their  American counterparts,  were skeptical of  the Berne model  of  international
copyright in the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century since that model
appeared  to  benefit  copyright-exporting  countries  in  Europe  with  well-developed
printing  and  publishing  industries  whereas  Canadian  printers  and  publishers  have
historically relied on the reprinting of foreign works as their primary source of revenue.12
In  the  1980s,  copyright  policy  in  the  United  States  made  a  decisive  turn  toward
strengthening and expanding copyright protection through the integration of copyright
and other forms of intellectual property into international trade agreements. Canadian
copyright policy largely moved in step with that of the United States, culminating in
Canada’s membership in the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (1994) and the World Intellectual Property
Organization’s  Copyright  Treaty  (1996)  which  provide  rights-holders  with  enhanced
control over the reproduction and use of intellectual property. Many key decisions in
Canadian and American copyright law dealing with cryptomnesia emerged in this period
of  transition  when  copyright  protection  was  expanding  across  new  media  (print,
electronic, digital) and in time (with the successive extensions of the term of copyright in
international agreements). As Sara Bannerman notes, the international copyright regime
Copying machines
Transposition, 6 | 2016
4
that emerged in the late twentieth-century through international agreements has led to
growing  concerns  about  copyright’s  potential  to  stifle  free  expression,  intensify  the
commodification of creative labour and works, constrain the public domain, and hinder
“democratic  participation  in  cultural  expression”.13 The  Canadian  legal  discourse  of
cryptomnesia in this  pivotal  period of  the 1980s provides a particularly rich site  for
exploring the juridical struggle to reconcile mediatised and nonconscious processes of
hearing, remembering, and copying with notions of creative subjectivity modeled on the
author-as-owner. The struggle to recognize nonconscious listening, remembering, and
copying as part of the ordinary practices of composers while at the same time marking
those processes as aberrations in “normal” musical creativity both reflects and facilitates
the realignment of copyright with the new economic and technological  conditions of
musical (re)production in the late twentieth century.
 
Musical memory and material evidence of plagiarism
12 Although Canadian copyright law was initially an extension of British imperial copyright
law, the trajectory of copyright policy in Canada began to parallel that of the United
States by the second half of the twentieth century. Among the similarities between US
and Canadian copyright law are the distinction between moral and economic rights in a
creative work as well as the notion—much more central to the present discussion—of the
determination  of  copyright  infringement  through  analysis  of  three  key  factors:  the
plaintiff’s ownership of the work and the defendant’s access to it (that the plaintiff is the owner
of the work by virtue of having expressed it in fixed form and that the defendant had
access to this source material), originality (that the source material is an “original work,”
which  usually  means  that  the  work’s  melody  and  possibly  its  rhythm  and  other
characteristics have not been copied from other works), and substantial similarity between
the allegedly infringing work and the source material.  Judge Denault summarized the
evidentiary requirements for copyright infringement lawsuits in his decision in Grignon v.
Roussel,  a  musical  copyright  infringement  case  wherein  the  plaintiff  successfully
convinced the court that the defendant had plagiarized his work.14
To succeed in such an action a plaintiff must show the following: (1) that he has a
copyright  in  the  musical  work,  (2)  that  it  is  an original  work,  and (3)  that  the
defendant unfairly copied it, that is, he had access to the plaintiff's work before
composing his own, and that a substantial part of both works is very similar.
13 René Grignon successfully sued Jean-Alain Roussel for infringing upon his copyright in
“Chanson numéro 7,” which Grignon initially claimed he composed in August 1987 and
later  distributed,  in  Judge  Denault’s  words,  “to  certain  librettists  and  people  in  the
artistic world in Montréal, hoping that a song would be eventually made from it” (§ 2). A
song was eventually made from musical score with lyrics written by Luc Plamondon, but
the composition was attributed to someone else. “Tous les Juke-Box,” sung by Martine St-
Clair, was released in March 1988 and the cover indicated that Jean-Alain Roussel was its
composer. Given that Grignon was successful in his action against Roussel, it is worth
noting  that  at  each  of  the  three  steps—proving  ownership,  originality,  and
misappropriation—Grignon’s  private  memory  and  the  discourses  and  technologies  of
representation through which private memory is publicly communicated begin to drift
apart. 
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14 To prove ownership of  the work,  authors must demonstrate that the expression was
communicated in “fixed form;” these material traces then become important for proving
that the defendant had or likely had access to the work. To this end, Grignon opened a
sealed envelop in court, which he had mailed to himself in February 1987. The envelope
contained a cassette recording of a song along with a letter bearing Grignon’s signature
asserting  that  he  had  written  the  song,  entitled  “Luc,”  in  November  1986.  In  Judge
Denault’s words, Grignon was “clearly surprised by the unexpected title given to his work
and its date of composition” (§ 12). This gap between memory and material evidence was
quickly smoothed over by Grignon’s explanation that he had originally intended the song
for Céline Dion but after sending the song to Dion’s producer, who never replied, Grignon
changed the song’s title to “Luc” since he had a new singer for the song in mind, Luc
Plamondon, who confirmed that he had received a cassette copy from Grignon. Since
Grignon had mentioned all of these copies and persons to whom he had sent them in his
prior testimony, the court did not doubt the validity of his explanation. 
15 In an attempt to undermine the originality of “Chanson Numéro 7 / Luc”, counsel for
Roussel called upon expert witnesses who compared it with fourteen other songs to show
that Grignon’s composition was “not new.” However, Judge Denault criticized counsel for
the defendant for neglecting the question of whether or not Grignon had access to, or
remembered hearing, any of these apparently similar compositions: “It is important to
note that apart from ‘Born to run,’ no effort was made to have René Grignon identify any
of these melodies or to determine whether he knew of them or had already heard them”
(§ 19).  Although  the  court  dismissed  these  demonstrations  of  similarity,  it  is
characteristic of such cases that the composer’s work, when subjected to this kind of
scrutiny,  reveals  the  manner  in  which recollection and composition are  much more
closely intertwined than copyright’s ideal of independent creation would suggest.
16 In their assessments of the degree of similarity between Grignon’s and Roussel’s songs,
the expert witnesses provided just the sort of analysis that Judge Denault seemed to be
seeking.  Judge  Denault  was  most  impressed  by  Jacques  Faubert,  a  musicologist  who
concluded his “painstaking analysis” with an “overall assessment of 24.5 out of 29, or
84.5%,  representing the degree  of  similarity  between the  two refrains  which he  had
analysed” (§ 36-7). Nevertheless, following Harold Fox’s rule, set out in The Canadian Law
of Copyright and Industrial Designs in 1967, that similarities be determined “by the ear as
well as by the eye,” Judge Denault asserted that “in the final analysis, it is for the judge—
so much the better if he has a musical ear and knowledge—to decide whether according
to his own assessment, experience and judgment an impression of similarity is created by
the  disputed  musical  works”  (§ 37).  Although  Judge  Denault  claimed  that  “tests  of
hearing” are “subjective,” he was confident that he would be able to discern “objective”
aural similarities through repeated auditions of the sound recordings during the court
proceedings. Judge Denault’s remarks about “tests of hearing” are surprising, since they
suggest that copyright law in Canada may occasionally privilege listening over looking to
reconstruct the “objective” sequence of events that resulted in “striking similarities”: 
Writing imposes natural limits on the reproduction of what is perceived on hearing
a musical work; it is not possible to accurately reproduce by words the impression
made on the ear by hearing alternately the first measures of the refrain of these
two works: it is striking. In the case at bar, I have no hesitation in concluding that
in melodic,  harmonic and rhythmic terms, the first eight measures of “Chanson
Numéro 7” and “Tous les juke-box” have such a striking resemblance that one can
only be a copy of the other, with minor differences resulting from arrangements or
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substitution chords. I also consider that this resemblance applies to a significant
part of the work, not in quantitative but in qualitative terms, in that it concerns the
first  measures  of  the refrain which are  the “hook” that  the ear  retains  for  the
purpose of identifying a piece. (§ 39)
17 Although  Roussel  claimed  that  he  wrote  “Tous  les  juke-box”  independently,  Judge
Denault found that the similarities were so striking that they could only be the result of
either a very unusual coincidence or plagiarism. Since Grignon was able to show that
Roussel  had  the  opportunity  to  hear  “Chanson  numéro  7 / Luc,”  Roussel  and  his
witnesses’ “vague” testimonies were supplanted by material traces of striking similarity
between the two songs which the court interpreted as the cause-and-effect relationship
of plagiarism.
18 From  Dillingham to  Grignon,  courts  shift  between  different  sets  of  criteria  in  their
assessments  of  misappropriation  or  plagiarism.  In  the  former  case,  the  composer’s
interest  in  maintaining  his  reputation  cast  doubt  on  the  plaintiff’s  accusation  of
deliberate  plagiarism.  In  Grignon, the  audience’s  memory  and  the  marketing  and
mnemonic functions of hooks were considered to be key factors in determining whether
one  composer  had  copied  another.  Each  court  uses  different  characteristics  of  the
composer, the audience, or the work to reinstate the bounded subject in the context of
multiple and fluid connections between the self and the social world of music production.
19 The concept of plagiarism, even in an apparently straightforward (or “flagrant”) case like
that of Grignon, is based on certain normative presumptions about communication. As
Ron Scollon argues,
the more or less standard contemporary view of communication is based on the
assumption that at any particular moment “one will be speaking his own thoughts
on a matter and expressing his own feelings.” Definitions of plagiarism that are
commonly given are also based on the idea that a person, the rightful owner, has
expressed  his / her  own  thoughts  or  feelings,  and  that  another  has  wrongly
appropriated them for some other use. Underlying both of these views is a concept
of knowledge and communication which takes ideas, as well as their wordings, as
capable of being originally crafted by individuals.15
20 Scollon suggests  that  the  seemingly  simple  concept  of  plagiarism is  shorthand for  a
bundle  of  “hefty  concepts”  including  “the  nature  of  the  person  who  undertakes  to
communicate,  the  concepts  of  the  ownership  of  discourse  as  individual  or  personal
property”.16
21 Scollon insightfully points out that charges of plagiarism often reproduce a particular
view of the subject of communication as the owner of his or her discourse. However, this
type of possessive subjectivity is also based on a figuration of human memory as fallible.
Juxtaposed with the court’s  “objective” reconstructions of  a person’s actions and the
trajectories of recordings in the social world, memories articulated in court can be made
to  seem  unreliable,  distorted  or  selective.  In  plagiarism  cases,  humanly  embodied
memory is often characterized as vulnerable to the plagiarist’s ambition and to his or her
misplaced sense of entitlement. Indeed, as I argue in the next section, the desire to be an
author-owner  in  accordance  with  evidentiary  requirements  of  copyright  law  may
encourage composers to perceive similarities between strands of musical discourse as
“striking” similarities (that is, as unlawful copies).
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Between plagiarism and authorship
22 In the spring of 1973, a commercial for Salada tea featuring a catchy piano jingle called
“The Homecoming” aired on Canadian television.17 In response to the many letters that
Salada’s advertising agency received from the public about the song, the composer of
“The Homecoming,” Hagood Hardy, extended the sixteen bar jingle into a 45 rpm single.
The record reached the Top 10 across Canada in 1975 and sold over a million copies. In
June 1981, Hardy was sued by Ivan Gondos, a piano teacher, composer and performer,
who  alleged  that  Hardy  had  plagiarized  parts  of  “The  Homecoming”  from  Gondos’
“Variations on a Theme in A Minor.”18 Over the course of three days, Gondos submitted
evidence against Hardy and another composer, Rudy Toth, whose “Moment of Love” was
also, according to Gondos, copied from “Variations.” Although Gondos and his supporters
seemed  convinced  that  Hardy  and  Toth  had  plagiarized  Gondos’  composition,  the
defendants insisted they had never heard Gondos’ “Variations” and therefore could not
have plagiarized it.  Desperate to be recognized as the legitimate author and rightful
owner of the musical works in question, counsel for Gondos deployed the concept of
cryptomnesia to explain the striking similarities between the three works. 
23 The concept of cryptomnesia can be traced at least as far back as Carl Jung’s theory of
creativity as a process of unconscious recollection and recombination.19 Jung believed
that unconscious copying was a normal part of the creative process. However, since the
1920s, courts have used the concept to refer to abnormalities in the creation of cultural
works. Jurists usually deploy the concept of cryptomnesia in order to explain how it is
possible  for  composers  to  plagiarize  work  which  they  believe  to  be  their  own.  The
growing  legal  and  psychological  discourse  surrounding  this  concept  elucidates
institutional  assumptions  about  the  proper  role  of  musical  memory  in  the  creative
process. While the legal system uses cryptomnesia as the exception to prove the rule (that
composers  do  not  usually  unintentionally  copy  from  memory),  the  concept  of
cryptomnesia also problematizes some of copyright law’s foundational dualisms, such as
self / other, experience / expression, creation / copying, and composition / recollection.
24 Copyright law’s demand for originality generates an excessive desire to be recognized as
the point of origin of the work. The legal system manages this excess in some cases by
exposing  the  person’s  memory  as  contaminated  or  distorted  by  ambition,  and  by
correcting  distorted  memories  according  to  the  “objective”  reality  disclosed  by
recordings and other material traces of action. Caught in an untenable position between
authorship and plagiarism, the composer may attempt to make material traces conform
to his or her memory. Gondos is perhaps the best example of this process at work in
Canadian case law.
25 The actions filed by Gondos against Hardy and Toth began to backfire as suspicions were
raised that  Gondos had tampered with the evidence.  Although the decision does not
explicitly state this, it began to look as though Gondos had modified “Variations” in order
to transform it from a superficially similar work into a strikingly similar work. Gondos fell
into what Beverly Haviland calls “a relation between subject and abject—the ‘unliveable’
other of adequately developed subjectivity.”20 Having internalized the rules of copyright
law, composers who hear similarities between their work and those of others may become
fixated on proving infringement, since the other subject position—the place in between
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author and plagiarist—is “unliveable” in the sense that copyright law makes no room for
partially plagiarized works or partial plagiarists; one is either a legitimate author or not.
26 Many musical composers do not earn a living from what they do. Gondos, for instance,
had to  supplement  whatever  income he  may  have  earned from his  obscure  musical
compositions by working as pianist in a cocktail lounge and teaching piano lessons. Such
composers, who are not recognized as the authors of anything valuable, also live in a
society where popular music generally adheres to strict formulas and rationalized modes
of production. Under such conditions, composers who have never been recognized as
legitimate authors may become extremely distrustful of other musicians and composers
whenever they hear similarities between their works and those of others. Gondos seems
to have moved from paranoia to plagiarism,  both of  which,  in Haviland’s  words,  are
characterized by “an instability in the recognition of and respect for boundaries between
self  and other.”21 Gondos and his  supporters were convinced that  other people were
copying him, that his work was original, and that other similar works were derivatives of
his own. But the tragedy of the case is that it clearly demonstrates how the evidentiary
requirements  of  originality  can “thwart  a  writer’s  attempt  to  negotiate  her  complex
relationship with her origins.” The valorization of originality in copyright law seems to
have provoked Gondos’ obsession with presenting similar works as plagiarized versions of
his compositions, and his various attempts to make representational memory conform to
his embodied memory of being the composer.
27 As the court  tried to  establish the  facts  of  the  case,  Gondos’  memory seemed to  be
increasingly  inconsistent  with  the  sequence  of  events  as  reconstructed  by  expert
witnesses and technologies of representation. Gondos was not able to convince the court
that  a  photocopy  of  the  “Variations”  score  represented  his work.  Whereas  Gondos
claimed he gave this photocopy to one of his students “years ago, 1965 or so, I don’t
know,” expert witnesses pointed out that the “signs of reproduction,” including track
marks on the paper as well as the size of the paper, matched Xerox machines available in
1974-5,  but  not  in  1965  (Gondos,  § 8  and  13).  Gondos  also  claimed that  he  made  his
recording  of  “Variations”  in  August  1974,  before  he  heard  “The  Homecoming”  in  a
version of the Salada commercial that featured a church. This version of the commercial,
however, was not aired after July of that year. Gondos’ memory of his own actions did not
seem to correspond to the circulation of recordings and other media he had submitted as
evidence,  that  is,  the  photocopy  given  to  his  piano  student,  the  audio  recording  of
“Variations” that was missing the variation from which Hardy and Toth had allegedly
copied,  the dates  that  particular  Salada commercials  were broadcasted on television,
Gondos’ submission to BMI of an array of works in 1965 which also omitted “Variations”,
and the musicological opinion that his four page folio of “Variations” contained “the
work of another person” (Gondos, § 23). 
28 Counsel  for  the  two  defendants  asked  the  judge  to  dismiss  the  case  due  to  these
inconsistencies. As Judge Carruthers wrote in his decision: “In their final analyses of why
all claims and contentions of the plaintiff in this action should be rejected, counsel for all
the defendants submit that little, if any, credibility be attached to the evidence of the
plaintiff as it bears on the issues raised in this action” (§ 28). Judge Carruthers agreed,
pointing to Gondos himself as the “worst offender” among all the witnesses “who were
caught up in the promotion of the plaintiff’s case to such an extent that they lost much of
any objectivity they might otherwise have about the matters in issue” (§ 29). The decision
portrays Gondos and his supporters as blinded by their desire to help Gondos prove that
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his work had been plagiarized.  At  the same time,  however,  it  is  clear that  something 
motivated Gondos and his supporters which, in my view, cannot be reduced to monetary
gain.  The  similarities  between  Gondos’,  Hardy’s,  and  Toth’s  works  were  perhaps
“striking” to Gondos and his supporters, who had heard Gondos’ work first, and it did not
seem possible to them that this resemblance was coincidental. Counsel for Gondos later
attempted to convince the court that there was a causal relationship between the works
resulting  from unconscious  plagiarism on  the  part  of  Hardy  and  Toth.  After  hearing
several experts on this matter, and after referring to several cases where the possibility
of  unconscious  plagiarism  had  been  raised,  Judge  Carruthers  maintained  that  the
similarities were coincidental and did not stem from the same source.
29 As I argue in the next section, assumptions about memory are more visible or legible in
cases of cryptomnesia than in “flagrant” cases of plagiarism. Cryptomnesia highlights the
problem of maintaining a sharp division between mind and matter through copyright’s
idea / expression dichotomy. More importantly, the figure of the author as a victim of
cryptomnesia highlights the manner in which copyright confronts the notion that artistic
production frequently involves “copying from memory” and that, rather than consisting
of impressions or ideas arranged, recalled and narrated in a manner that is unique to the
individual, memory may be rather more machine-like in its indiscriminate accumulation
and transmission of “registered” experiences. Thus, the case law on cryptomnesia is a
particularly useful domain in which copyright’s domestication of potentially disruptive
interrelationships between memory, technology, and consciousness can be explored. 
 
Figurations of memory in the discourse of
cryptomnesia
30 Given its role in managing innovation, creative labour, and the disruptive potential of
technologies of reproduction, many scholars have correctly suggested that copyright is
an ideological apparatus that primarily serves the interests of large copyright owners.
Yet, cases of unconscious plagiarism or cryptomnesia are highly suggestive of the manner
in  which  copyright  law  may  also  act  as  a  quasi-therapeutic  regime  of  memory  by
acknowledging  the  loss  of  integrity  or  personality  that  arguably  follows  from  the
misrecognition  of  memory  as  invention.  The  court  plays  the  role  of  a  recognizing
authority by acknowledging that in cases of inadvertent plagiarism both the defendant
and plaintiff  have lost  something integral  to  the  self,  or  will  lose  something that  is
integral to the self (albeit, through misrecognition) as a result of the decision.
31 The most sympathetic statement recognizing this dual loss was put forward by Judge
Owen in his decision in ABKCO Music v.  Harrisongs after finding George Harrison’s “My
Sweet Lord” (including a particular grace note) was indeed “strikingly similar” to the
Chiffons’ “He’s So Fine.”22
What happened? I  conclude that  the  composer,  in  seeking musical  materials  to
clothe  his  thoughts,  was  working  with  various  possibilities.  As  he  tried  this
possibility and that, there came to the surface of his mind a particular combination
that pleased him as being one he felt would be appealing to a prospective listener;
in other words,  that this  combination of  sounds would work.  Why? Because his
subconscious knew it  already had worked in a song his  conscious mind did not
remember. Having arrived at this pleasing combination of sounds, the recording
was made, the lead sheet prepared for copyright and the song became an enormous
success. Did Harrison deliberately use the music of He’s So Fine? I do not believe he
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did so deliberately. Nevertheless, it is clear that My Sweet Lord is the very same song
as He’s So Fine with different words, and Harrison had access to He’s So Fine. This is,
under  the  law,  infringement  of  copyright,  and  is  no  less  so  even  though
subconsciously accomplished.
32 Lawyers for musicians facing charges of plagiarism frequently refer judges to Harrisongs,
and in particular to Judge Owen’s admission that cryptomnesia was not only possible but
that  it  was  the most  plausible  explanation for  striking similarity  in that  case.  Judge
Owen’s decision has forced judges in Canada and the US to at least form an opinion about
the notion of cryptomnesia and has spawned a substantial body of literature in legal
studies and psychology about cryptomnesia and its implications for copyright. 
33 Periodically, judges demonstrate that they have developed increasingly nuanced ways of
assessing whether copying in  fact  occurred and,  if  so,  whether  it  is  unlawful.23 This
expansion of the evidentiary requirements in some cases opens up the possibility for a
“copying-from-memory”  defense.  Legal  scholar  Carolyn Crowe,  for  example,  includes
“subconscious copying (copying from memory)” in a list of possible defenses which, in
her  view,  should  accompany the  more  nuanced approach developed in  case  law for
assessments of access and copying: “Subconscious plagiarism results when a prior work
so  impresses  itself  on  the  mind  of  a  subsequent  author  that,  quite  unwittingly  and
forgetting where he had seen or heard the prior work, he produces his work under the
submerged  influence  of  that  work.”24 Pointing  to  Jung’s  notion  of  cryptomnesia as
integral  to  creative  subjectivity,  as  well  as  to  more  recent  studies  in  experimental
psychology, Barbara Green writes: “Physiological evidence explains how it is that one is
able  to  tap  into  the  resource  of  ‘forgotten’  memories.  The  brain  never  forgets any
impression, no matter how slight. The physiology of the brain makes the reproduction of
old memory possible, even after many years of total oblivion.”25
34 While there are conflicting views regarding the time that may elapse between “access”
and the unconscious “reproduction of old memory,” jurists seem to increasingly agree
with the general principle outlined by Judge Hand in 1924, that “everything registers
somewhere in our memories, and no one can tell what may evoke it.” Moreover, the case
law suggests that this figuration of memory as a container for everything that has been
experienced leads to uncertainty about the independence of the compositional process:
no one can tell when an object of memory will be evoked in the creative process. 
35 While Judge Hand found that the period between “access” and “copying” was relatively
short, Judge Owen’s decision suggested that there had been a much longer delay between
Harrison’s  supposed  exposure  to  the  Chiffons’  song  and  his  subsequent  unconscious
plagiarism of  it.  In an infringement lawsuit  filed against  Michael  Bolton by the Isley
Brothers over the song “Love is  a Wonderful  Thing,” the court devoted considerable
attention  to  Bolton’s  teenage  exposure  to  a  song  that  he  was  found  to  have
subconsciously copied in his professional career as an adult.26 Bolton appealed, pointing
out that if in fact he and his co-author, Andrew Goldmark, had subconsciously plagiarized
the  Isley  Brothers’  song,  this  amounted  to  a  “twenty-five-years-after-the-fact-
subconscious  copying  claim.”27 In  her  decision for  the  appellate  court,  Judge  Nelson
responded by  supporting  the  Isley  Brothers’  claim:  “It  is  entirely  plausible  that  two
Connecticut  teenagers [Bolton and Goldmark]  obsessed with rhythm and blues music
could remember an Isley Brothers’ song that was played on the radio and television for a
few weeks, and subconsciously copy it twenty years later.”28
Copying machines
Transposition, 6 | 2016
11
36 Canadian courts have been more reluctant to introduce this figuration of unconscious
memory as actively disguising traces of “pleasing combinations of sounds” as inventions,
although this concept of memory is cited, as was the case in Gondos,  when either the
plaintiff or the defendant refers the judge to cases like Harrisongs. When the defendant or
the plaintiff in a case of musical copyright infringement admits that he or she may have
plagiarized the plaintiff’s work, but has done so unconsciously, the court is confronted
with  the  possibility  that  memories  may  be  misrecognized  as  one’s  own  creations.
However, American and Canadian courts stop short of admitting that the blurry relations
between  self / other,  memory / invention,  and  embodied  versus  representational
memory may be a part of the “normal” process of musical production.
37 Legal  scholars  have developed various  rationales  for  using cryptomnesia  as  a  partial
defence against copyright infringement in the US and Canada.29 Many of these assertions
are based on the view that copyright law’s model of the creative process is outdated or
idealistic and does not recognize the role of memory, technology, standardization, and
the different contexts in which music is made meaningful. Under these conditions, the
production of strange, striking or, as Adorno once called them, “haunting” similarities
between  the  works  of  two  or  more  individuals  seems  unsurprising.30 Nevertheless,
responsibility and liability for unconsciously generated similarities falls on the individual
composer.
38 In seeking a more nuanced assessment of similarity, copying, damages, and remedies,
legal  scholars  suggest  that copyright  infringement  cases  should  be  informed  by  an
examination, in as much detail as possible, of the contexts of production. The implication
is that the court should pay closer attention to changes in context in order to determine
whether two works are in fact the same rather than inferring causal relations between
original and the alleged copy from note-by-note comparison. As Aaron Keyt argues,
a composer creates something more than a string of acoustical events. Rather, the
thing created is best viewed as a structure of relationships. Because the sounds in a
composition are dependent on one another for their meaning, musical meaning is
solely a function of context. Thus, preservation of context must be a crucial element of
copying.31
39 In order  to  determine whether  there has  been a  change in context  and thus  in the
meaning  of  a  work,  Keyt  suggests  that  courts  should  modify  their  historiographic
practices and carry out an analysis of the works with an ear toward both musical and
contextual considerations.
40 Green goes further and argues that “all artistic works subconsciously plagiarize previous
artistic works.”32 As Green suggests, courts often assume that it is possible to make a
sharp  division  between  (shared  and  abstract)  ideas  and  (individualized  and  fixed)
expressions  but  in  practice  shift  this  line  in  a  case-by-case  way  to  validate  the
idea / expression dichotomy enshrined in copyright law. Yet, this move in jurisprudence
toward  normalising  cryptomnesia in  legal  commentary  also  renders  memory  as
autonomous;  memory  controls  the  process  of  musical  production,  operating
independently of the psyche or the volition of the person. The creative subject is thus
reconfigured with his or her unconscious memory as the driving force.
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Conclusion: Copyright in a bind
41 While copyright is often associated with the regulation of reproduction as a means to
encourage creativity,  the confrontation of  courts  with claims of  cryptomnesia in the
context of infringement lawsuits highlights the manner in which copyright also imposes
a  disciplinary  framework  on  listening  and  memory.  While  judges  may  occasionally
empathize  with  defendants  who  misrecognize  non-conscious  recollection  of  musical
experience as creative expression, and while courts may recognize that the technologies
and  practices  of  musical  production  and  consumption  are  often  entwined  in  the
contemporary milieu of creative labour, in the end, creativity is separated from the broad
spectrum  of  possible  modes  of  engaging  with  sound  and  what  might  be  called  an
attributional or “source monitoring” mode of perceptual,  signifying,  representational,
and  reproductive  processes  is  normalised.  Moreover,  the  implication  of  the  legal
discourse of cryptomnesia, which is constructed as an aberration rather than as a normal
part  of  creativity,  is  that  the  creative  subject  becomes  responsibilised  or  made
responsible  for  managing  the  legal  and  financial  risks  stemming  from  his  or  her
entanglement in a nexus of print, electronic and digital technologies that allow sounds to
be split from their sources.
42 Copyright disciplines listening within the court as well as outside of it. As Michael Mopas
and  Amelia  Curran  note,33 the  quantitative  and  qualitative  analysis  of  substantial
similarity has gradually shifted over the past few decades in Canada and US from the
analysis of  whether the “lay listener” would likely hear similarities between the two
works to visual and acoustic analysis carried out by forensic musicologists. Canadian case
law on cryptomnesia is suggestive of broader patterns in the legal regulation of creation
and memory with its  attentiveness  to  melody (and corresponding neglect  of  timbre,
rhythm and other musical element), its reliance on musicological expertise, its distrust of
the  “average  listener,”  and most  importantly  for  the  argument  of  this  paper,  in  its
insistence on listening, remembering, and creating as fundamentally distinct processes.
The increasing reliance  on comparative  analysis  of  visual  representations  of  musical
expressions in the assessment of substantial similarity seems to suggest that copyright
keeps both memory (of resonances and filiations between the works in question and the
thousands  that  came  before)  and  listening  in  their  place,  that  is,  as  secondary  and
supplementary to creativity, and, in the context of court proceedings, to visual modes of
producing knowledge about the ontological status of a musical work as an original or
derivative  work.  The  distrust  of  hearing  and  embodied  memory,  along  with  the
corresponding urge to deploy visual techniques of musical representation and analysis,
become particularly pronounced in cases of cryptomnesia.
43 Although unconscious plagiarism is not yet an acceptable defense for infringement, there
is an underlying therapeutic role that the court assumes in recognizing the loss of one’s
self  or  expression thereof,  usually  in the discourse of  economic losses  and damages.
Notwithstanding the fact that copyright is in an important sense an economic regime, not
all doctrines, principles, rules, and tests in copyright law can be reduced to the goal of
efficiency and  other  utilitarian  justifications  for  copyright  protection.  Through  a
modified  version  of  Jung’s  concept  of  cryptomnesia,  Canadian  and  American  courts
uphold  the  values  of  uniqueness  and  originality  while  simultaneously  reinforcing  a
system of music production characterized by standardization, and protect the abstract
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personage  of  the  author  while  simultaneously  parceling  out  his / her / its  rights  to
various entities. The unruliness of memory and, in particular, its disregard for propriety
boundaries, can potentially undermine the sharp division between ideas and expressions.
But copyright law continues to govern musical memory not only by constraining the
manner in which people access the musical past, but also by requiring human memory to
be  as  precise,  fixed,  and  “objective”  as  representational  technologies  and  expert
reconstructions of musical events.
44 The  emergence  of  cryptomnesia  in  copyright  courts  might  also  be  understood  as
articulation of  anxiety  about  the  mediatization of  music  and the  attendant  shifts  in
embodied experience, habits of perception and remembering, and systems of signification
and representation.  In  a  similar  way as  more recent  developments  such as  mash-up
culture give rise to debates about the locus of creativity in an era of software that can
“listen”  and  “play”  for  or  with  human users,  cases  of  cryptomnesia  foreground the
problems of  defining a  creative  role  that  is  “properly”  human in  the  late  twentieth
century music-making milieu characterized by industrial logics of managing risk in music
production and increasingly automated tools for creating music. The integrity of human
memory and creativity are put into question when the court’s attention is drawn to the
growing intimacy of humans and machines in the production, reproduction, perception
and  recollection  of  sound  and  music.  Cryptomnesia  highlights  the  problem  of
disembedding authorial subjects from radio, photocopiers, phonographs, and other media
that exploit  the aural  overlaps between machinic and human memory.  Cryptomnesia
helps “explain away” substantial similarity but also amplifies the tension between the
court’s role in discursively reinforcing a model of human creativity based on notions of
aesthetic originality while also underwriting the industrial production of interchangeable
musical  works.  The tension between copyright’s  role  as  a  recognizing institution for
authorial subjectivity and its facilitating role in the production of, for example, jingles for
television commercials is  particularly legible in cases of cryptomnesia,  but that same
tension can be found in the discourse around computer or algorithmic creativity, where
the same tools that are used by large copyright owners (and universities) to automate the
process of identifying plagiarized works can in turn be used to create new literary texts,
visual  works  and musical  compositions.  The cautious  and selective  manner in which
jurists mobilize the notion of cryptomnesia in musical copyright disputes points to the
manner in which cryptomnesia has the potential to exacerbate rather than smooth over
tensions in copyright law stemming from the dispersion of listening, remembering, and
creating  across  networks  of  disseminated  composers,  musicians,  institutions,  and
machines.
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ABSTRACTS
Although there is a large body of scholarly literature on musical copyright, very little of this
work explores in a sustained and direct way the role of copyright in regulating musical memory.
This paper conceptualizes sound recording as a mnemonic technology and analyzes the manner
in which copyright law attempts to manage the impact of this technology on legal concepts of
musical memory and authorial subjectivity. The paper analyzes the case law on “cryptomnesia”
or unconscious plagiarism in the United States and Canada wherein defendants claimed not to
have  access  to  the  original  work  and  therefore  could  not  have  copied  it.  These  contested
similarities highlight the dispersion of memory and creativity across a heterogeneous network
that includes composers, musicians, and producers but also institutions and machines, and leads
to the present difficulty of recentering the authorial subject in legal discourses and practices. In
this  way,  late  twentieth  century  legal  disputes  over  unconscious  plagiarism  anticipate
contemporary anxieties about the entanglement of creative and consumer subjectivities with
digital  techniques in recent  litigation campaigns against  mash-up remixing,  peer-to-peer  file
sharing, and other popular practices of online music reproduction. Then as now, copyright acts
as a site for disciplining and normalising certain modes of listening to and remembering sound
recordings  which  in  turn  help  smooth  over  tensions  in  the field  of  capitalist  music
(re)production.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Copyright, musical plagiarism, cryptomnesia, sound recording, creative subjectivity,
musical memory
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